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Abstract
Modern distributed data management systems face a new
challenge: how can autonomous, mutually-distrusting par-
ties cooperate safely and eectively? Addressing this chal-
lenge brings up questions familiar from classical distributed
systems: how to combine multiple steps into a single atomic
action, how to recover from failures, and how to synchronize
concurrent access to data. Nevertheless, each of these issues
requires rethinking when participants are autonomous and
potentially adversarial.
We propose the notion of a cross-chain deal, a new way to
structure complex distributed computations in an adversarial
seing. Deals are inspired by classical atomic transactions,
but are necessarily dierent, in important ways, to accommo-
date the decentralized and untrusting nature of the exchange.
We describe novel safety and liveness properties, along with
two alternative protocols for implementing cross-chain deals
in a system of independent blockchain ledgers. One protocol,
based on synchronous communication, is fully decentralized,
while the other, based on eventually-synchronous communi-
cation, necessarily requires stronger trust assumptions.
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1 Introduction
Today’s distributed data management systems face a new and
daunting challenge: enabling commerce among autonomous
parties who do not know or trust one another, a model we
call adversarial commerce.
In classical distributed systems, participating parties are
trusted to behave properly; parties may be implemented as
replica groups if necessary to mask crashes and Byzantine
failures, and thus ensure trust is warranted. e computa-
tions are oen organized as atomic transactions that ensure,
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for example, that transactions appear to run in one-at-a-time
order, taking eect either everywhere or nowhere. Compu-
tation is directed by a trusted coordinator, and executed by
parties that can be trusted to follow directions.
By contrast, in adversarial commerce each party decides
for itself whether to participate in a particular interaction.
Because parties are autonomous, they cannot be forced to
run common hardware or soware. Instead, they agree only
to follow a common protocol, an agreement that can be mon-
itored, but not enforced. Correctness is local and selsh:
the common protocol should guarantee that all parties that
follow the protocol end up “no worse o” than when they
started, even in the presence of faulty or malicious behavior
by other parties. Examples of adversarial commerce include
securities trading, digital asset management, the Internet of
ings, supply chain management, and, of course, cryptocur-
rencies.
Specically, we consider a system consisting of a collection
of autonomous parties, where each party controls some set
of assets. Parties may exchange assets among themselves in
complex ways for mutual benet (see the example below).
Each asset is tracked on a replicated, distributed, tamper-
proof ledger called a blockchain. Our model is agnostic about
the particular algorithms and data structures underlying the
blockchains, requiring only that they operate correctly, and
are capable of running simple programs known as contracts
(sometimes “smart contacts”).
is paper makes the following contributions.
• We propose the notion of a cross-chain deal, a new
computational abstraction for structuring complex
distributed exchanges in an adversarial seing. Deals
are inspired by classical atomic transactions, but dif-
fer, in essential ways, to accommodate the autonomous
and potentially adversarial nature of the parties.
• e well-known ACID correctness properties of atomic
transactions must be rethought and reformulated for
adversarial commerce. We dene new safety and live-
ness properties appropriate for interactions among
mutually-untrusting autonomous parties.
• We describe two new protocols for implementing
cross-chain deals. A fully-decentralized timelock pro-
tocol assumes a synchronous communication model.
We then argue that no fully decentralized protocol
can tolerate periods of communication asynchrony.
Our certied blockchain (CBC) protocol does not rely
on synchrony. It is based on two-phase commit but
diers in interesting ways.
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• We provide an analysis of the resource costs of the
two protocols. Given the immature state of today’s
blockchain technology, we focus on inherent, abiding,
platform-independent trade-os and costs rather than
explicit performance measurements.
Specic blockchains and blockchain-like mechanisms may
rise or fall, but the need for adversarial commerce is here to
stay. Future distributed data management systems will be
expected to operate in such a world, and the time has come
to examine how such computations can be dened, specied,
and implemented. In several key ways, deals in adversarial
commerce are dierent from atomic transactions. Neverthe-
less, the two concepts serve the same high-level purpose
of allowing clients to compose complex computations from
simpler ones in a safe and well-structured way.
1.1 Example
Alice is a ticket broker. She buys tickets at wholesale prices
from event organizers and resells them at retail prices to
consumers, collecting a modest commission. Alice lives in
the future, where tickets are managed on a ticket blockchain,
a tamper-proof replicated ledger that tracks ticket ownership.
Similarly, the coins paid for those tickets live on a distinct
coin blockchain. Both blockchains support contracts, simple
programs that control when and how ownership of tickets
and coins is transferred.
One day, Bob, a theater owner, decides to sell two coveted
tickets to a hit play for 100 coins. Alice knows that Carol
would be willing to pay 101 coins for those tickets, so Alice
moves to broker a deal between Bob and Carol.
Alice’s task is to devise a distributed protocol, executed
by Alice, Bob, and Carol, communicating through contracts
running on various blockchains, to execute a cross-chain
deal that transfers the tickets from Bob to Carol, and the
coins from Carol to Bob, minus Alice’s commission. If all
goes as planned, all transfers take place, and if anything goes
wrong (someone crashes or tries to cheat), no honest party
should end up worse o. E.g., Alice does not want to end up
holding tickets she can’t sell or coins that she must refund.
As discussed in Section 8, Alice, Bob, and Carol’s deal
cannot be executed as an atomic cross-chain swap, the focus
of much prior work [10, 11, 17, 26, 32, 33, 42]. In a cross-chain
swap, each party transfers an asset directly to another, and
halts. In this example, however, Alice enters the deal with no
assets to swap: her value is to act as a broker between Bob
and Carol, which requires more complex indirect transfers.
While cross-chain swaps can be considered a special case
of cross-chain deals, cross-chain deals can be substantially
more exible and powerful.
2 Cross-Chain Deals
Here we dene cross-chain deals and how to execute them.
Alice Bob Carol
Alice 100 coins tickets
Bob tickets
Carol 101 coins
Figure 1. Alice, Bob, and Carol’s deal. Rows represent out-
going transfers, and columns incoming transfers
2.1 Specifying the Deal
e deal is captured by a matrix (or table), where each row
and column is labeled with a party, and the entry at row i
and column j shows the assets to be transferred from party i
to party j . A party’s column states what it expects to acquire
from the deal (its incoming assets), and its row states what it
expects to relinquish (its outgoing assets). A party enters a
deal if the proposed transfers leave it beer o, and it agrees
to commit (complete) the deal if it deems the actual outcome
to be at least as good as the agreed-upon deal.
In our example, the deal is given by the 3 × 3 matrix in
Figure 1. Carol expects to transfer 101 coins to Alice in return
for tickets transferred from Alice. Similarly, Bob expects to
transfer tickets to Alice in return for 100 coins from Alice.
Although the gure refers only to “tickets”, the specic (non-
fungible) tickets to be provided would be part of the deal
specication, while the specic (fungible) coins would likely
be omied.
2.2 Deal Protocols
Parties to a deal carry out a protocol to complete the deal’s
transfers. In an environment where parties can fail or cheat,
no protocol can guarantee that all transfers take place as
promised by the deal specication. Which kind of partial
transfers should be deemed acceptable?
Instead of distinguishing between faulty and non-faulty
parties, as in classical models, we distinguish only between
compliant parties who follow the protocol, and deviating
parties who do not. Many kinds of fault-tolerant distributed
protocols require that some fraction of the parties be com-
pliant. For example, proof-of-work consensus [30] requires
a compliant majority, while most Byzantine fault-tolerant
(BFT) consensus protocols require more than two-thirds of
the participants to be compliant. For cross-chain deals, how-
ever, it seems prudent to make no assumptions about the
number of deviating parties.
Our classication of parties into compliant and deviating
is partly inspired by the classication in the BAR model [2],
which identies parties as rational, altruistic, or Byzantine.
In adversarial commerce, compliant parties are rational par-
ties that decide to follow the protocol; all others are deviating,
whether rational or not. ere are no altruistic parties. Criti-
cally, our classication diers from that of BAR (and other
standard models of Byzantine behavior) by not limiting the
number of Byzantine parties.
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e most fundamental safety property is (informally) that
compliant parties should end up “no worse o”, even when
other parties deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. A cross-
chain deal protocol satises safety if:
Property 1. For every compliant party X ,
• If any of X ’s outgoing assets is transferred, then all of
X ’s incoming assets are transferred.
• If any of X ’s incoming assets is not transferred, then
none of X ’s outgoing assets is transferred.
e rst condition states that if a compliant party ends
up paying anything, it gets everything. e second condi-
tion states that if a compliant party ends up not receiving
something, it pays nothing.
is notion of safety weakens the classical all-or-nothing
property of atomic transactions. Safety permits the “all” out-
come where every compliant party’s incoming and outgo-
ing assets are transferred, as well as the “nothing” outcome
where no compliant party’s assets are transferred. However,
safety also permits outcomes where a compliant party pays
nothing but receives assets from deviating parties, or pays
less than expected for its incoming assets. Such outcomes,
while unlikely in practice, cannot be ruled out because we
cannot constrain the behavior of potentially-irrational devi-
ating parties.
Cross-chain task protocols typically rely on some form of
escrow to ensure the good faith of participating parties. e
following weak liveness property ensures that conforming
parties’ assets cannot be locked up forever.
Property 2. No asset belonging to a compliant party is locked
up forever.
Finally, we would like protocols to satisfy the following
strong liveness property:
Property 3. If all parties are compliant, all transfers happen.
In general, strong liveness is possible only in periods when
the communication network is synchronous, ensuring a xed
upper bound on message delivery time.
3 System Model
For our purposes, a blockchain is a publicly-readable, tamper-
proof distributed ledger (or database) that tracks ownership
of assets among various parties. An asset may be fungible,
like a sum of money, or non-fungible, like a theater ticket. A
party can be a person, an organization, or even a contract (see
below). We assume multiple independent blockchains, each
managing a dierent kind of asset. We restrict our aention
to blockchains that track asset ownership, and to deals that
transfer asset ownership from one party to another. We
assume all value transfers are explicitly represented on the
blockchain. For example, Alice does not send paper tickets
to Carol o-chain.
A party can publish an entry on a blockchain, and it can
monitor one or more blockchains, receiving notications
when other parties publish entries. In our model, publishing
an entry usually executes a blockchain-resident program
called a contract. We will use contracts for escrow: an asset
owner temporarily transfers ownership of an asset to a con-
tract. If certain conditions are met, the contract transfers
that asset to a counterparty, and otherwise it refunds that
asset to the original owner.
A party can publish a new contract on a blockchain, or call
a function exported by an existing contract. Contract code
and contract state are public, so a party calling a contract
knows what code will be executed. Contracts are typically
re-executed multiple times by mutually-suspicious parties
checking up on one another, so contract code must be deter-
ministic. A contract can access any data on the blockchain
where it resides, or call other contracts on that blockchain,
but it cannot directly access data from the outside world, and
cannot call contracts on other blockchains. e only way a
contract on blockchain A can learn of a change to a remote
blockchain B is if some party explicitly informs the contract
at A of B’s change. Naturally, the contract onA will typically
require some kind of “proof” that any information oered
about B’s state is correct.
In summary, adversarial commerce encompasses two dis-
tinct kinds of agents: contracts and parties. Contract code re-
sides publicly on a blockchain. It is deterministic and trusted.
It is also passive, executed only when called by active parties.
e parties are active, autonomous, and mutually untrusting.
ey are given a protocol, which each party may or may
follow. Parties may be rational, following their own interests,
or they may be irrational, departing from the protocol even
when it is not in their interests to do so [2].
We assume each party has a public key and a private key,
and that any party’s public key is known to all.
4 Executing Cross-Chain Deals
Escrow plays the role of classical concurrency control, en-
suring that a single asset cannot be transferred to dierent
parties at the same time. Here we specify what happens
when assets are put into escrow, and how ownership of es-
crowed assets transferred.
ere is a domain of parties P, and a domain of assets A.
(A party may be a person or a contract, and assets are digital
tokens representing items of value.) An asset can have only
one owner at a time: we say that Owns(P ,a) is true if P owns
a and no other party owns a.
A deal is executed as a cross-chain protocol. As the proto-
col runs, assets are tentatively transferred from one party to
another. If the deal execution commits at an asset’s blockchain,
that asset becomes the property of the transfer target, while
if the deal execution aborts at that blockchain, that asset is
refunded to its original owner. Commiing or aborting is
local to each asset’s blockchain.
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We represent the state of an active deal by two maps
C : A → P and A : A → P, both initially empty. C(a)
indicates the eventual owner of asset a if the deal commits at
a, and A(a) if it aborts at a. We say OwnsC (P ,a) to indicate
that P will own a if the deal commits, and OwnsA(P ,a) to
indicate that P would own a if the deal aborts.
Now we dene what happens when an asset is placed in
escrow by P during deal D.
Pre: Owns(P ,a)
Post: Owns(D,a) and OwnsC (P ,a) and OwnsA(P ,a)
e precondition states that P can escrowA only if P owns a.
If the precondition is satised, the postcondition states that
ownership of a is transferred from P to D (via the escrow
contract), but P remains the owner of a in both C and A,
since no tentative transfer has happened yet, so P would
regain ownership of a if D were to terminate either way. For
example, when Bob escrows his tickets, they become the
property of the contract, but should the deal terminate right
then, the tickets would revert to Bob.
Next we dene what happens when party P tentatively
transfers an asset a to party Q as part of deal D.
Pre: Owns(D,a) and OwnsC (P ,a)
Post: OwnsC (Q,a)
e precondition requires a to be held in escrow by D, with
P the indicated owner should D commit. If the precondition
is satised, the postcondition states that Q will become the
owner should D commit (at this point). For example, when
Bob transfers his tickets to Alice, Alice becomes the owner
of those tickets in C .
Assets remain in escrow until the deal terminates. If it
terminates by commiing, the owners of assets inC become
the actual owners (displacing D). If it terminates by aborting,
the owners of assets in A become the actual owners (again
displacing D).
4.1 Phases
A deal is executed in the following phases.
Clearing: A market-clearing service discovers and broad-
casts the participants, the proposed transfers, and possibly
other deal-specic information. e market clearing service
may be centralized, but need not be trusted, because each
party decides for itself whether to participate. e precise
structure of the service is beyond the scope of this paper.
Escrow: Parties escrow their outgoing assets. For example,
Bob escrows his tickets and Carol her coins.
Transfer: e parties perform the sequence of ownership
transfers according to the deal. For example, Bob transfers
the tickets to Alice, who subsequently transfers them to
Carol.
Validation: Once the tentative transfers are complete, each
party checks that its incoming assets are properly escrowed
(so they cannot be double-spent), and that the trade-o be-
tween the incoming and outgoing assets is satisfactory. For
example, Carol checks that the tickets to be transferred are
escrowed, that the seats are (at least as good as) the ones
agreed upon, and that she did not somehow overpay.
Commit: e parties vote on whether to make the tentative
transfers permanent. If all parties vote to commit, the es-
crowed assets are transferred to their new owners; otherwise
those assets are refunded to their original owners.
In the classical two-phase commit protocol [8], valida-
tion usually requires no semantic checks; instead a party
agrees to prepare if appropriate locks are held and persis-
tence is guaranteed. Under adversarial commerce, however,
an application-specic validation phase is needed for each
party to decide whether the tentative nal state is satisfac-
tory. For example, only Carol can decide whether the tickets
she is about to purchase are ones she wants.
Cross-chain deals rely on two critical, intertwined mecha-
nisms. First, the escrow mechanism prevents double-spending
by making the escrow contract itself the asset owner. Care
must be taken that assets belonging to compliant parties do
not remain escrowed forever in the presence of malicious
behavior by counterparties. Second, the commit protocol
must be resilient in the presence of malicious misbehavior. A
deviating party may be able to steal assets if it can convince
some parties that the deal completed successfully, and others
that it did not. If a deviating party can prevent (or delay)
a decision by the commit protocol, then it can keep assets
locked up forever (or a long time).
e principal challenge in implementing cross-chain deal
protocols is the design of the integrated escrow management
and commit protocol. Just as with classical transaction mech-
anisms, there are many possible choices and trade-os. In
the remainder of this paper, we describe two cross-chain deal
protocols, implemented via contracts, one for the synchro-
nous timing model, and one for the eventually-synchronous
model, each making dierent trust assumptions.
5 Timelock Commit Protocol
We now describe a timelock commit protocol where escrowed
assets are released if all parties vote to commit. Parties do not
explicitly vote to abort. Instead, timeouts are used to ensure
that escrowed assets are not locked up forever if some party
crashes or walks away from the deal. is protocol assumes
a synchronous network model where there is a known upper
bound ∆ on the time needed to change any blockchain’s
state in a way observable by all parties.
In our example, Bob places his tickets into escrow, then
transfers them to Alice, who transfers them to Carol. All
parties examine their incoming assets, and if those assets are
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satisfactory, the parties vote to commit at the escrow contract
on each asset’s blockchain. For example, if Alice, Bob, and
Carol all register commit votes on the ticket blockchain,
the escrow contract releases the tickets to Carol. All votes
are subject to timeouts: if any commit vote fails to appear
before the contract’s timeout expires, the tickets revert to
Bob. (Symmetric conditions apply to Carol’s coins.)
Because of the adversarial nature of a deal, each party is
motivated to publish its vote on the blockchains controlling
its incoming assets (it is eager to be paid), but not on the
blockchains controlling its outgoing assets (it is not so eager
to pay). To align the protocol with incentives, one party’s
commit vote may be forwarded from one escrow contract to
another by a motivated party.
For example, Bob is motivated to publish his commit vote
only on the coin blockchain. However, once published, Bob’s
vote becomes visible to Carol, who is motivated to forward
that vote to the ticket blockchain. Carol’s position is sym-
metric: she is motivated to publish her vote only on the
ticket blockchain, but Bob is motivated to forward it to the
coin blockchain. Alice is motivated to send her vote to both
blockchains. (Nevertheless, no harm occurs if a party sends
its commit vote directly to any contract.)
A tricky part of this protocol is how to choose timeouts.
Simply assigning each party a timeout for each asset is in-
correct, as shown by the following example.
Suppose that the ticket and coin escrows assign Alice time-
outsAt andAc respectively, and that Bob and Carol’s commit
votes have already been published on both blockchains. In
one scenario, Alice waits until just before Ac to register her
vote on the coin blockchain, unlocking Carol’s payment to
Bob. It may take time ∆ for Carol to observe Alice’s vote and
forward it to the ticket blockchain, implying thatAt ≥ Ac+∆.
In another scenario, Alice waits until just before At to regis-
ter her vote on the ticket blockchain, unlocking Bob’s tickets
for Carol. It may take time ∆ for Bob to observe Alice’s
vote and forward it to the coin blockchain, implying that
Ac ≥ At + ∆, a contradiction.
To resolve this dilemma, each escrow contract’s timeout
for a party’s commit vote depends on the length of the path
along which that vote was forwarded. For example, if Alice
votes directly, her vote will be accepted only if it is received
within ∆ of the commit protocol’s starting time. is vote
must be signed by Alice. If Alice forwards a vote from Bob,
that vote will be accepted only if it is received within 2 · ∆ of
the starting time, where the extra ∆ reects the worst-case
extra time needed to forward the vote. is vote must be
signed rst by Bob, then Alice. Finally, if Alice forwards
a vote that Bob forwarded from Carol, that vote will be
accepted only if it is received within 3 · ∆, and so on. is
vote must be signed rst by Carol, then Bob, then Alice. We
refer to this chain of signatures as the vote’s path signature.
In general, a vote from party X received with path signa-
ture p must arrive within time |p | · ∆ of the pre-established
commit protocol starting time, where |p | is the number of
distinct signatures for that vote.
Clearing Phase: e market-clearing service broadcasts
the following to all parties in the deal: the deal identier
D, the list of parties plist, a commit phase starting time t0
used to compute timeouts, and the timeout delay ∆. Most
blockchains measure time imprecisely, usually by multiply-
ing the current block height by the average block rate. e
choice of t0 should be far enough in the future to take into
account the time needed to perform the deal’s tentative trans-
fers, and ∆ should be large enough to render irrelevant any
imprecision in blockchain timekeeping. Because t0 and ∆
are used only to compute timeouts, their values do not aect
normal execution times, where all votes are received in a
timely way. If deals take minutes, then ∆ could be measured
in hours.
Escrow Phase: Each party places its outgoing assets in es-
crow through an escrow contract
escrow(D,Dinfo,a).
on that asset’s blockchain. Here D is the deal identier and
Dinfo is the rest of the information about the deal (plist, t0,
and ∆); the escrow requests takes eect only if the party is
the owner of a and a member of the plist.
Transfer Phase: Party P transfers a subset a′ of asset a
tentatively owned by P to party Q by sending
transfer(D,a,a′,Q).
to the escrow contract on the asset’s blockchain. e party
must be the owner of a and Q must be in the plist.
Validation Phase: Each party examines its escrowed in-
coming assets to see if they are satisfactory and the deal
information is correct. If so, the party votes to commit.
Commit Phase: Each compliant party sends a commit vote
to the escrow contract for each incoming asset. (A complaint
party is free to altruistically send commit votes to other
escrow contracts as well.) A party uses
commit(D,v,p)
to vote directly and to forward votes to the deal’s escrow
contracts, where v is the voter and p is the path signature
for v’s vote. (Since D is eectively a nonce, nothing extra is
needed to guard against replay aacks.)
A contract accepts a commit vote only if it arrives in time
and is well-formed: all parties in the path signature are
unique and in the plist, and their signatures are valid and
aest to a vote from voter . If the commit is accepted, that
contract has now accepted a vote from the party.
A contract releases the escrowed asset to the new owner(s)
when it accepts a commit vote from every party. If the
contract has not accepted a vote from every party by time
5
Alice
CarolBob
tickets tickets
100 coins 101 coins
Figure 2. Alice, Bob, and Carol’s deal expressed as a digraph
t0 +N · ∆, where N is the number of parties, it will never ac-
cept the missing votes, so the contract times out and refunds
its escrowed assets to the original owners.
5.1 Well-formed Deals and Decentralization
For ease of exposition, we can think of a deal as a directed
graph (digraph), where each vertex represents a party, and
each arc represents a transfer; the digraph for our deal is
shown in Figure 2.
If the deal digraph is not strongly connected, it can be
shown that the deal is not well-formed, in the sense that it
must include one or more “free riders” that collectively take
assets but do not return any [26]. e remaining parties have
no incentive to conform to any protocol executing such a
deal, because they could improve their payos by excluding
the free riders1.
A compliant party rst sends votes to the escrow contracts
on its incoming assets’ blockchains. en it monitors its
outgoing assets’ blockchains and forwards other parties’
votes to its incoming assets’ blockchains. No party needs to
interact with any other blockchains. For example, if Carol
owns only altcoins, then as part of the deal, she can go to
David to exchange her altcoins for coins, and the deal can
commit without parties such as Bob needing to interact with
the altcoin blockchain (or even know about it). is protocol
is decentralized in the sense that there is no single blockchain
that must be accessed by all compliant parties.
is voting protocol reects the (incentive-compatible)
minimum a compliant party must do. Nothing prevents
compliant parties from sending their commit votes directly to
arbitrary blockchains. For example, Bob might send his vote
directly to the ticket blockchain, perhaps hoping to speed
up the commit process. If he does so, he passes up a (very
unlikely) opportunity to cheat Carol if she (non-compliantly)
fails to claim her tickets in time.
In the remainder of this section, we assume that deals are
well-formed, and the corresponding digraphs are strongly
connected, although our timelock protocol can handle ill-
formed deals if needed.
1 Perhaps the free riders are sending some kind of hidden o-chain payments
to the other parties, but support for hidden payments is beyond this paper’s
scope.
5.2 Correctness
eorem 5.1. e timelock protocol satises safety.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that compliant party
X ’s outgoing asset a is released from escrow and transferred
(with commit votes from every party), but the escrow for
X ’s incoming asset b times out and is refunded because of a
missing vote from party Z . Suppose Z ’s commit vote at a’s
contract arrived with path signature p. e signatures in p
cannot include X ’s, because X is compliant and would have
already forwardedZ ’s vote tob. Z ’s vote must have arrived at
a before time t0+ |p | ·∆. SinceX is compliant, it forwards that
vote to b’s contract along pathXp, before time t0+(|p |+1) ·∆,
where that vote is accepted, a contradiction. 
eorem 5.2. e timelock protocol satises weak liveness:
no compliant party’s outgoing assets are locked up forever.
Proof. Every escrow created by a compliant party has a nite
timeout. 
eorem 5.3. e timelock protocol satises strong liveness.
Proof. If all parties are compliant, they all send commit votes
to the escrow contracts for their incoming assets. Each time a
new commit vote appears on an outgoing asset’s contract, the
party forwards it to its incoming assets’ contracts. Since the
deal is well-formed, the deal digraph is strongly connected,
and all commit votes are forwarded to all contracts in time.

5.3 Remarks
Like any synchronous-model protocol, ∆ must be chosen
large enough to make denial-of-service aacks prohibitively
expensive. Suppose that Bob acquires Alice and Carol’s votes
on time, and forwards them to claim the coins, but Alice
and Carol are driven oine before they can forward Bob’s
vote to the ticket blockchain, so Bob ends up with both the
coins and the tickets. Technically, this outcome is correct
because Alice and Carol have deviated from the protocol by
not claiming their assets in time. Indeed, any timelock-based
commit protocol has a window during which parties may lose
their assets by going oine at the wrong time. To address a
similar risk, the Lightning payment network [35] employs
watchtowers [13], parties that monitor escrow contracts and
step in to act on the behalf of o-line parties in danger of
losing assets.
6 Certied Blockchain Commit Protocol
Now we describe a commit protocol that does not rely on
network synchrony. More precisely, we adopt the semi-
synchronous communication model [18], where the network
starts out asynchronous, with no bound on message delivery
times, but eventually reaches a global stabilization time (GST)
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where message delivery delays become bounded2. With this
model we can no longer handle aborts by depending on
bounded timeouts for escrow, so instead we allow parties to
vote to abort as well as to commit: they vote to commit if
validation succeeds, and they vote to abort if validation fails,
or if too much time has passed.
e protocol is motivated by the classical two-phase com-
mit protocol [8], but diers in some interesting ways. In
particular, there is no coordinator; instead we use a special
blockchain, the certied blockchain, or CBC, as a kind of
shared log. e CBC might be an additional blockchain or
one of those already being used in the deal.
Instead of voting to commit transfers of individual assets,
as in the timelock protocol, each party votes on the CBC
whether to commit or abort the entire deal. e CBC serves
to record and order these votes. A party can extract a proof
from the CBC that particular votes were recorded in a partic-
ular order. A party claiming an asset (or a refund) presents a
proof of commit (or abort) to each contract managing that
asset. e contract checks the proof’s validity and carries
out the requested commit or abort if the proof is valid. A
proof of commit proves that every party voted to commit the
deal before any party voted to abort. A proof of abort proves
that some party voted to abort the deal before every party
voted to commit. A party can rescind an earlier commit vote
by voting to abort (for example, if the deal is taking too long
to complete). To ensure strong liveness, once a compliant
party has voted to commit, it must wait time at least ∆ before
rescinding that vote.
Recall that a commit protocol is decentralized if there is
no single blockchain accessed by all parties in any execution.
e CBC protocol is not decentralized in this sense, because
the CBC itself is a centralized “whiteboard” shared by all
parties. is loss of decentralization is inevitable: no protocol
that tolerates periods of asynchrony can be decentralized.
A formal proof is out of scope, but we sketch an informal
argument adapted from Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [21].
If all parties are compliant, then if the deal commits (resp.
aborts) at any asset’s blockchain, it must commit (resp. abort)
at all of them. Initially, the deal’s state is bivalent: both
commit and abort are possible outcomes. But the deal’s state
cannot remain bivalent forever, so it must be possible to reach
a (bivalent) critical state where each party is about to take a
decisive step that will force the protocol to enter a univalent
state where either a commit outcome or an abort outcome
becomes inevitable. A potentially decisive step forcing an
eventual commit cannot take place at a dierent blockchain
than a potentially decisive step forcing an eventual abort,
because then it would be impossible to determine which
happened rst, hence which one was truly decisive. It follows
that in any such critical state, all parties must be about to
call the same contract, violating decentralization.
2In practice, we require only that the synchronous periods last “long enough”
to complete the deal.
Here are the phases of the CBC protocol. A discussion of
what proofs are like appears in Section 6.2.
Clearing Phase: e market-clearing service broadcasts a
unique identier D and a list of participating parties plist
(this protocol does not require the t0 starting time nor ∆).
One party records the start of the deal on the CBC by pub-
lishing an entry:
startDeal(D, plist).
e calling party must appear in the plist. If more than
one startDeal for D is recorded on the CBC, the earliest is
considered denitive.
Escrow Phase: Each party places its outgoing assets in es-
crow:
escrow(D, plist,h,a, . . .)
Here, h is the hash of the startDeal that started the deal; the
hash is needed in case there is more than one such entry
on the CBC. e ellipsis indicates arguments that vary de-
pending on the algorithm used to implement the CBC, as
discussed in Section 6.2. As in the timelock protocol, the
sender must be the owner of asset a and a member of the
plist.
Transfer Phase: Party P transfers a subset a′ of asset a
tentatively owned by P to party Q by sending
transfer(D,a,a′,Q).
to the escrow contract on the asset’s blockchain. P must be
the owner of a and Q must be in the plist.
Validation Phase: As before, each party checks that its
incoming assets are satisfactory and properly escrowed with
the correct plist and h.
Commit Phase: Each party X publishes either a commit or
abort vote for D on the CBC:
commit(D,h,X ) or abort(D,h,X )
whereD is the deal identier, andh is the startDeal. As usual,
each voter must be in the start-of-deal plist.
6.1 Correctness
e correctness of the CBC protocol is mostly self-evident:
safety is satised because a deal either commits everywhere
or aborts everywhere, weak liveness is satised because any
compliant party whose assets are locked up for too long will
eventually vote to abort, and strong liveness is satised in
periods when the network is synchronous because every
compliant party votes to commit before any compliant party
votes to abort.
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6.2 Cross-Chain Proofs
e CBC acts as a shared log visible to all parties, allowing
parties to determine which commit or abort votes were reg-
istered, and, importantly, the order in which they were reg-
istered. e decisive vote is the one that determines whether
the deal commits or aborts. However, it is not enough to
convince active parties that a deal commied or aborted;
it is also necessary to convince passive contracts on var-
ious blockchains so they will correctly transfer or refund
escrowed assets.
A straightforward approach is to present each contract
with a subsequence of the CBC’s blocks, starting with the
initial block containing the deal’s rst startDeal record, and
ending with block containing the decisive vote. But how
can we be sure that the blocks presented are really on the
CBC? e answer depends partly on the kind of algorithm
underlying the CBC blockchain.
Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Consensus: Let us assume the
CBC relies on Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus [1,
4, 12, 38]. Blocks are approved by a known set of 3f + 1
validators, of which at most f can deviate from the protocol.
(e details of how validators reach consensus on new blocks
are not important here.) To support long-term fault tolerance,
the blockchain can be recongured periodically by having at
least 2f + 1 current validators elect a new set of validators.
BFT protocols guarantee safety even when communication
is asynchronous. ey ensure liveness when communication
becomes synchronous aer the GST.
Each block in a BFT blockchain is vouched for by a certi-
cate containing at least 2f + 1 validator signatures of that
block’s hash. If the block contains an entry that identies
3f + 1 new validators along with their public keys, the new
validators will be in charge of the next block. e sequence
of blocks and their certicates can be used as a proof. e
contract on the asset blockchain will be able to check this
proof as long as it knows the rst block’s set of validators.
is is accomplished by passing the 3f + 1 validators of the
initial block as an extra argument to each of the deal’s escrow
contracts (in place of the ellipses). Parties must provide the
correct validators when puing assets in escrow, and they
must check their correctness before voting to commit.
Checking the proof as just described is a lot of work; the
proof is likely to be spread over many blocks, each containing
a large number of entries. Furthermore, we cannot shorten
the proof by having the party tell the contract which entries
to look at, since that would allow a malicious party to fool a
contract into making a wrong decision. But there are many
ways to make BFT proofs more ecient.
A straightforward optimization is to take advantage of
the fact that the CBC has validators. is allows the par-
ties to request certicates from the CBC. Such a certicate
would vouch for the current state of the deal (active, com-
mied, aborted). is certicate alone would be enough of a
proof provided the validators haven’t changed since the deal
started; otherwise the party must also provide the chain of
validators.
Proof-of-work (Nakamoto) Consensus: Proofs of commit
or abort generated by a CBC implemented using proof-of-
work consensus (like Bitcoin [30] or Ethereum [19]) are pos-
sible, but such blockchains lack nality: any proof might be
contradicted by a later proof, although producing a later, con-
tradictory proof becomes more expensive to the adversary
the longer it waits.
Here is a scenario where Alice can construct a fake “proof
of abort” for a proof-of-work CBC. As soon as the deal ex-
ecution starts, Alice (perhaps aided by partners in crime)
privately mines a block that contains an abort vote from
Alice. When her part of the deal is complete, however, Alice
publicly sends a commit vote to the CBC. If, by the time all
parties have voted commit, Alice was able to mine a private
abort block, then Alice can use that fake proof of abort to halt
outgoing transfers of her assets, while using the legitimate
proof of commit to trigger incoming transfers.
In the spirit of proof-of-work, this aack can be made
more expensive by requiring a proof of commit or abort to
include some number of conrmation blocks beyond the one
containing the decisive vote, forcing Alice to outperform
the rest of the CBC’s miners for an extended duration. To
deter rational cheaters, the number of conrmations required
should vary depending on the value of the deal, implying that
high-value deals would take longer to resolve than lower-
value deals.
To summarize, while it is technically possible to produce
commit or abort proofs from a proof-of-work CBC, the result
is likely to be slow and complex. In the same way a proof-
of-work blockchain can fork, a proof-of-work proof can be
contradicted by by a later proof. Similarly, to make the
production of contradictory proofs expensive, the proof’s
diculty must be adjusted to match the value of the assets
transferred by the deal. By contrast, a BFT certicate of
commit or abort is nal, and independent of value of the
deal’s assets.
7 Cost Analysis
is section analyzes the costs associated with each of the
protocols. We use a cost structure inspired by that of the
Ethereum [41] blockchain, since that is currently the best-
developed platform, but the costs on other blockchains are
not likely to be radically dierent.
Consider a deal with n participating parties,m assets, and
t ≥ m transfers.
7.1 Gas Costs
To make denial-of-service aacks prohibitively expensive,
virtual machines that execute contracts typically charge for
each instruction executed. In Ethereum [41], this charge
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1 contract EscrowManager {
2 ERC20Interface asset ; // contract holding assets
3 mapping(address => uint) escrow; // escrowed assets
4 mapping(address => uint) onCommit; // result of tentative transfers
5 …
6 // transfer into escrow account
7 function escrow (uint amount) public {
8 require ( asset . transferFrom(msg.sender, this , amount));
9 escrow[msg.sender] = escrow[msg.sender] + amount;
10 onCommit[msg.sender] = onCommit[msg.sender] + amount;
11 }
12 // tentative transfer
13 function transfer (address to , uint amount) public {
14 require (onCommit[msg.sender] >= amount);
15 onCommit[msg.sender] = onCommit[msg.sender] − amount;
16 onCommit[to] = onCommit[to] + amount;
17 } … }
Figure 3. Pseudocode for Escrow and Transfer (various details omied)
Protocol Escrow Transfer Validation Commit or Abort
Timelock O(m) writes O(t) writes none O(mn2) sig. ver. + O(m) writes
CBC O(m) writes O(t) writes none O(m(2f + 1)) sig. ver. + O(m) writes
Figure 4. Gas costs
is expressed in terms of Gas units, whose value (in Ether,
the Ethereum blockchain’s native currency) varies according
to demand. For example, the gas cost of simple arithmetic
operations or accesses to short-lived memory is in single
digits, and control ow or read operations from long-lived
storage is in double or triple digits. In general, gas costs are
dominated by two kinds of operations: writing to long-lived
storage is (usually) 5000 gas, and each signature verication
is 3000 gas.
To illustrate our gas cost analysis, Figure 3 shows a
fragment of a pseudocode implementation of a generic
EscrowManager contract for a fungible asset, modeled as an
ERC20-standard token [22]. e heart of the EscrowManager
contract is a pair of mappings: escrow records how many
tokens each party has escrowed (Line 3), and onCommit
records how many tokens each party would receive if the
deal commits at this asset (Line 4). For clarity, some error
checking has been omied.
Escrow phase: Each party calls the escrow function to es-
crow some number of tokens. is function incurs 2 stor-
age writes (in a function call) to transfer the token from
the sender to the escrow contract (Line 8), and 1 storage
write each to update the escrow (Line 9) and the onCommit
(Line 10) maps, for a total of 4 storage writes. Globally, the
escrow phase incurs O(m) gas costs.
Transfer phase: Each party calls the transfer function
to transfer some number of escrowed tokens to another
party. is function incurs 1 storage write to decrement
the sender’s tentative onCommit balance (Line 15), and an-
other to increment the recipient’s balance (Line 16). Globally,
the transfer phase incurs O(t) gas costs.
Validation phase: Each party monitors its incoming and
outgoing escrow contracts to ensure it is satised with the
assets it is due to acquire and relinquish. is computation
takes place entirely at the parties, and incurs no gas cost.
Timelock protocol commit phase: Timelock escrow con-
tracts verify commit path signatures. Note that signatures
are generated by parties, not by contracts, so while signature
generation incurs computation costs at parties, it incurs no
gas costs at contracts.
Figure 5 shows a pseudocode fragment for a timelock
escrow contract. e contract records the set of parties par-
ticipating in the deal (Line 2) and which ones have voted
(Line 2). e commit function takes as arguments the voter,
the set of signers, and their signatures. It checks that the
deal has not timed out (Line 6), that the voter is legitimate
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1 contract TimelockManager is EscrowManager{
2 address[] parties ; // participating parties
3 address[] voted; // which parties have voted
4 …
5 function commit (address voter , address[] signers , bytes32[] sigs ) public {
6 require (now < start + (path. length () ∗ DELTA)); // not timed out
7 require ( parties . contains ( voter )); // legit voters only
8 require (! voted. contains ( voter )); // no duplicate votes
9 require (checkUnique(signers )); // no duplicate signers
10 for ( int i = 0 ; i < signers . length ; i++) {
11 require (checkSig( voter , signers [ i ], sigs [ i ])); // expensive
12 }
13 voted.push(voter ); // remember who voted
14 }}
Figure 5. Pseudocode for Timelock contract voting (some details omied)
(Line 7), that the vote has not already been recorded (Line 8),
and that there are no duplicate signers (Line 9). e expen-
sive steps are verifying each of the signatures (Line 11), and
recording the voter (Line 13) in long-lived storage.
Each escrow contract veries a vote from each of n parties,
and each party’s vote could have been signed by up to n
others, yielding a worst-case per-contract bound of O(n2)
signature verications, plus a constant number of storage
writes for other bookkeeping. Since there are m contracts,
the timelock commit protocol incurs an O(mn2) global gas
cost. In the best case, a deal can abort with no signature
verications, but in the worst case, aborting can cost almost
as much as commiing.
CBC protocol commit phase: Escrow contracts check
proofs from the CBC by verifying that they are correctly
signed by enough validators. Figure 6 shows a pseudocode
fragment for an escrow contract for a CBC using an un-
derlying BFT consensus protocol that tolerates f Byzantine
validators. We assume the optimization where parties re-
quest status certicates from the CBC; for brevity, we assume
there have been no recongurations.
e contract keeps track of the CBC’s current set of val-
idators (Line 2); it also knows their public keys. e commit
function takes as arguments the set of signers and their
signatures. It checks that there are no duplicate validators
(Line 6), that all voters are validators (Line 7), and that there
are enough votes (Line 8). e expensive step is verifying
each of the validator signatures (Line 10); there will also be
a constant number of storage writes to record the outcome
and to update the escrow and ownership mappings.
Each contract veries 2f + 1 signatures, or (k + 1)(2f + 1)
if the set of validators has changed k times. e global gas
cost is O(m(2f + 1)) signature verications plus a constant
number of storage writes to update the escrow mappings.
7.2 Time Costs
We analyze each commit protocol’s timing delays when the
network is synchronous, with bound ∆ on the time needed
both to change a blockchain state, and to have that change
observed by any interested party.
For both protocols, if all parties are conforming, the escrow
phase takes time at most ∆, since every party updates its
outgoing assets’ escrow contracts in parallel. Similarly, the
transfer phase takes time at most t · ∆. It may be possible
to execute transfers concurrently, in which case this phase
takes time at most ∆. e validation phase takes time at most
∆, since each party must observe each escrow contract’s most
recent state.
Timelock protocol commit phase: If each party sends its
commit vote only to the blockchains managing its incoming
assets, then the worst-case duration of the commit phase
is proportional to the longest sequence of transfers, which
is bounded by n∆. If parties (altruistically) send their votes
directly to all blockchains, then the bound is just ∆.
CBC protocol commit phase: All conforming parties send
their votes to the CBC in parallel, and these votes are avail-
able very quickly when the CBC is executed using a BFT
protocol such as PBFT [12].. It requires at most another ∆
for the escrow contracts to transfer or refund their assets.
8 Related Work
In a cross-chain swap [10, 11, 17, 26, 32, 33, 42], each party
transfers an asset to another party and halts. Cross-chain
swaps are aractive because they reduce or eliminate the use
of exchanges, some of which have proved to be untrustwor-
thy [39, 40]. However, as noted, the three-way deal described
in our example cannot be formulated as a swap because Alice
starts with nothing to swap. She uses Carol’s coins to buy
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1 contract CBCManager is EscrowManager{
2 address[] validators ; // CBC validators
3 …
4 // check commit proof is valid
5 function commit (address[] signers , bytes32[] sigs ) public {
6 require (checkUnique(signers )); // no duplicate signers
7 require ( validators . contains ( signers )); // only validators vote
8 require ( signers . length >= 2f +1); // enough validators vote
9 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 2f+1; i++) {
10 require (checkSig( signers [ i ], sigs [ i ])); // expensive
11 }
12 outcome = COMMITTED; // remember we commied
13 } … }
Figure 6. Pseudocode for CBC contract (some details omied)
Protocol Escrow Transfer Validation Commit Abort
Timelock ∆ t∆ or ∆ ∆ O(n)∆ O(n)∆
CBC ∆ t∆ or ∆ ∆ O(1)∆ per-party timeout
Figure 7. Delays for synchronous communication
Bob’s tickets, and Bob’s tickets to induce Carol to pay her
coins. Another example that cannot be expressed as a swap
is the auction described in Section 9.
Hashed timelocked contracts are oen used for cross-chain
swaps [10, 11, 17, 32, 33]. Herlihy [26] proposed a multi-party
cross-chain swap protocol, based on hashed timelocked con-
tracts. At the start, a subset of parties, called “leaders” gener-
ate secrets. First, the leaders publish their escrow contracts,
and then followers do the same, as contract publication prop-
agates through the swap digraph in a carefully-chosen order.
In the next phase, aer all contracts are in place, the leaders
release their secrets, also propagated through the digraph in
a particular order. e timelock commit protocol presented
here is has a simpler structure. By replacing secrets with
votes, and by treating all parties uniformly, the timelock pro-
tocol eliminates the need for the careful contract deployment
phase, and claries when parties review the transactions nal
outcome. Both commit protocols use timeout mechanisms
based on path signatures.
O-chain payment networks [16, 23, 25, 31, 35] and state
channels [15] use hashed timelock contracts to circumvent
the scalability limits of existing blockchains. ey conduct
repeated o-chain transactions, nalizing their net transac-
tions in a single on-chain transaction. e use of hashed time-
lock contracts ensures that parties cannot be cheated if one
party tries to sele an incorrect nal state. Like swaps and
deals, payment channels require a synchronous communica-
tion model. Luu et al. [29] propose using (hardware) trusted
execution environments to ease synchrony requirements. It
remains to be seen whether trusted execution environments
can be applied to adversarial deals. e authors are not
aware of o-chain networks that support cross-chain swaps
or deals. Arwen [25] supports multiple o-chain atomic
swaps between parties and exchanges, but their protocol is
specialized to currency trading and does not seem to sup-
port non-fungible assets. Komodo [33] supports o-chain
cross-platform payments using a trusted intermediary.
Sharded blockchains [3, 28] address scalability limits of
blockchains by partitioning the state into multiple shards
so that transactions on dierent shards can proceed in par-
allel, and support multi-step atomic transactions spanning
multiple shards. An atomic transaction that spans multiple
shards is executed at the client in Chainspace [3] , or at the
server in Omniledger [28]. In these systems a transaction
represents a single trusted party and there is no support for
transactions involving untrusted parties.
Chainspace [3] allows transactions to specify immutable
proof contracts to be executed at the server. e proofs
are used to validate client execution traces resembling opti-
mistic concurrency control. Channels [5], an extension of
Omniledger Atomix protocols, uses proofs in a two-phase
protocol similar to our CBC, for atomic untrusted cross-shard
single-step multi-party UTXO [27] transfers, but does not
support multi-step deals or non-fungible assets.
e BAR (byzantine, altruistic and rational) computa-
tion model [6, 14] supports cooperative services spanning
autonomous administrative domains that are resilient to
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byzantine and rational manipulations. Like Byzantine fault-
tolerant systems, BAR-tolerant systems assume a bounded
number of Byzantine faults, and as such do not t the ad-
versarial deal model, where any number of parties may be
Byzantine.
A (blockchain) oracle [34] is a trusted data feed that re-
ports physical-world occurrences to contracts. (For example,
an early frost report might trigger an insurance payment to
a farmer.) e CBC somewhat resembles an oracle, but in-
stead of reporting on the outside world, it acts as an internal
“whiteboard” shared by the parties.
An early precursor of adversarial commerce was the study
of federated databases [36], which addressed the problem of
coordinating and commiing transactions that span multi-
ple autonomous, mutually untrusting, heterogeneous data
stores. An important challenge was to achieve cross-database
serializable transactions where participants did not trust one
another to release locks in a timely way. (Federated databases
did not aempt to tolerate arbitrary Byzantine behavior.)
9 Discussion
Deals are not restricted to the unconditional transfers in our
earlier ticket-brokering example. For example, Alice might
auction a ticket as follows. Bob and Carol transfer their bids
as coins to Alice, and Alice’s contract compares the bids, and
transfers back the losing bidder’s coins and the ticket to the
winning bidder.3 is deal, too, cannot be expressed as an
atomic swap because Alice transfers assets she did not own
at the start.
Deals can also be structured to provide incentives for good
behavior. For example, to discourage maliciously joining
then aborting deals, a party might escrow a small deposit
that is lost if that party is the rst to cause the deal to fail.
Designing and implementing such incentives is an area of
ongoing research [20].
In the timelock commit protocol, if ∆ is chosen too small,
parties may be vulnerable to an extended denial-of-service at-
tack. In our example, if ∆ is chosen poorly, Bob, aer casting
his vote to commit, might fall victim to a denial-of-service at-
tack for longer than ∆, and may fail to claim his coins before
they are refunded to Alice. ere is a similar threat to the
CBC commit protocol, where the CBC itself might be the tar-
get of a denial of service aack, causing a deal’s assets to be
locked up for the duration of the aack. However, the CBC
protocol ensures that the deal either commits everywhere
or aborts everywhere; the timelock protocol does not.
A more subtle issue concerning the CBC commit protocol
is that the parties must trust the CBC not to engage in cen-
sorship, where CBC validators selectively choose to ignore
certain deals, causing them to abort when they could other-
wise have commied. e threat of hard-to-prove censorship
3 In practice, Bob and Carol should use a commit-reveal paern to ensure
neither can observe the other’s bid.
might present a challenge for mutually-untrusting parties to
agree on a trustworthy CBC provider.
Some form of signature combining may reduce space costs
in either commit protocol, although prior techniques [37] do
not seem immediately applicable.
If we assume (reasonably) that 2f + 1, the number of
compliant CBC validators usually exceeds n, the number of
compliant parties, then it will usually be more expensive
to commit a CBC deal (O(m(2f + 1))) than a timelock deal
(O(mn2)). But one gets what one pays for: the CBC protocol
works in a more demanding model.
10 Conclusions
e emerging domain of adversarial commerce is a kind of
fun-house mirror of classical distributed transactions: fa-
miliar features are recognizable, but distorted. We have
proposed the notion of cross-chain deals to ll the ecologi-
cal niche occupied by distributed atomic transactions, and
we have proposed using escrow contracts and distributed
blockchain-based commit protocols to play the role of classi-
cal concurrency control and the two-phase commit protocol.
Classical transactions are oen described in terms of the
well-known ACID properties [24]: atomicity, consistency,
isolation, and durability. Cross-chain deals are not classical
transactions, and these classical notions of correctness must
be rethought.
Classical atomicity means that all transfers take place,
or none do. In adversarial commerce, where parties are au-
tonomous and cooperation is voluntary, this global atomicity
property becomes a local property: each conforming party
ends up no worse o, no maer how deviating parties be-
have.
Classical isolation guarantees that concurrent transactions
cannot interfere, typically enforced via serializability or snap-
shot consistency. But serializability is a poor t for Alice,
Bob, and Carol, independent, concurrently-executing parties
who must interact with one another during the deal execu-
tion. In adversarial commerce, interference takes the form
of double-spending: what if Bob somehow concurrently sells
the same tickets to Carol and to someone else, collecting
coins from both? Escrow contracts replace classical locks
or snapshots, ensuring that ownership cannot unexpectedly
change while a deal is being executed.
We believe that adversarial commerce, dened as eco-
nomic exchange among mutually untrusted autonomous
parties, is here to stay. Moreover, a system architecture com-
posed of autonomous untrusted parties that communicate
via shared tamper-proof data stores is the most natural way
to organize such a system. Although we sketched implemen-
tations of cross-chain deals using today’s blockchains and
smart contracts, none of our principal results depends on
blockchains as such. We believe that the notion of a deal
as a computational abstraction will be central to any sys-
tematic approach to adversarial commerce, no maer what
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technology underlies the shared data stores. (ere are many
technologies hoping to displace blockchains, e.g. [7, 9]). e
“selsh” correctness conditions proposed here reect the in-
herent challenges of cooperation among untrusting parties.
Similarly, the centralization trade-os explored here for deal
implementations reect the inherent challenges of dealing
with the synchrony (or lack thereof) of the communication
network.
It is easy to confuse cross-chain deals with atomic transac-
tions, since they address similar needs. We hope this paper
has claried the critical distinctions between them, and ex-
plained why deals are needed to address the demands of
adversarial commerce.
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